2.11 Immigration

Any person is free to leave the State Territory.

Admission to citizenship

The Citizenship article, Section 1, defines the nature of citizenship:

Citizenship is a voluntary contractual relationship between a person and the State. A person becomes a Citizen only by formally declaring citizenship to the Central Bank and accepting the obligations of this Article, subject to the eligibility and admission rules in Section 2. Citizenship is never automatic and must be explicitly entered into.

Section 2 provides the eligibility rule:

Any person may apply for citizenship, subject to identity verification and additional eligibility requirements established by law. Eligibility requirements shall be published, objective, non‑discretionary, and consistent with the Non‑Discrimination Principle.

Section 2 also provides:

Admission Limits and Priority: The State may establish by law limits on the number of persons admitted to citizenship within specified periods. Laws may give priority to applicants who have resided within the State Territory for longer and to applicants who have a parent who is a Citizen. Priority based on a parent's citizenship may apply to applicants of any age and shall not confer citizenship automatically. Laws shall specify how residence is measured, how parental citizenship is established, and how the permitted priorities interact. Admission limits and priority rules shall be published, objective, non‑discretionary, and consistent with the Non‑Discrimination Principle. Among eligible applicants having equal priority under those rules, admission shall proceed in order of application.

Citizenship is membership in an association, whose existing members may set admission conditions subject to the constitution. The State provides UBI and services to citizens, but this does not oblige the association to accept everyone who wishes to join immediately. Section 2 expressly authorises limits on the number of persons admitted within specified periods, allowing laws to regulate the rate at which immigrants and other applicants become citizens. Admission must follow the published rules, subject to the constitution and in particular the Non-Discrimination Principle (NDP).

Article VII: Discrimination permits exceptions to the NDP including:

  • First-come, first-served priority up to a quota
  • Whether a person resides inside or outside the State Territory, and duration of residence within the State Territory
  • For admission to citizenship, whether a parent is a Citizen
  • Merit‑based suitability for a task
  • Allegiance to the constitution
  • Violations of the Non‑Aggression Principle (NAP)

For example, someone who has lived in the territory all their life may receive priority over someone who arrived a month ago, even if the recent arrival applied first. Children of citizens may receive priority at any age, but do not become citizens automatically.

The constitution permits these preferences without prescribing their relative weight or a particular admission rate. Those choices are left to laws made within the constitutional constraints.

Applying for citizenship does not itself confer citizenship or require applicants to close their G-accounts while waiting. Account closure occurs as part of entering citizenship. Once an applicant is entitled to admission and has satisfied all entry conditions, the CBPS identity registry must accept the declaration without discretionary approval. Citizenship takes effect upon that acceptance. These admission rules concern membership; they do not themselves determine permission to enter or reside in the territory.

Territorial ownership and entry

Citizens are assumed to constitute by far the majority of people within the State Territory. On that basis, VoTa recognises their association, the State, as a possible owner of property. We call this state ownership.

Article VI: Laws, Section 2, provides:

Every property right shall have exactly one owner, which may be a Person or the State. A resource may be privately owned, state owned, or unowned; these categories are mutually exclusive. A purported property right shared by two or more Persons has no legal meaning and shall not be recognised or protected by the State.

State ownership does not imply that everything within the State Territory is state owned; parcels of land and other resources may be privately owned.

Section 4 expressly includes the State's rights in its definition of aggression:

Aggression is defined as initiating or threatening to initiate significant interference with the property rights or agreements of a Person or the State through force, fraud, or negligence.

State ownership is treated as a property right, protected by the NAP. For example if the state owns a public road, then a person attempting to damage that road (such as with earth moving equipment) would be violating the NAP.

State ownership is an extreme form of collective ownership. Section 2 specifies how it is exercised:

State property is held by the State on behalf of its citizens. Decisions concerning its use, access, protection, and disposal shall be made through the constitutional processes of direct democracy. The exercise of state ownership shall comply with this Constitution, including the Non‑Aggression Principle and the Non‑Discrimination Principle.

Where non-citizens own parcels of land within the territory, it may be appropriate to give them voting rights.

Section 2 also defines a property right:

A property right is the right to exclude others from using a resource.

State ownership carries the right to exclude. The State may set conditions of access to and use of state-owned property, subject to the NAP and NDP. This for example means border control where a state-owned road crosses the territorial boundary is possible.

Section 4 permits proportionate defence of those rights:

Proportionate force may be used in self-defense or in defense of the property rights of a Person or the State. A Person or the State whose rights have been violated may seek restitution.

Unauthorised entry onto state-owned property or remaining after permission has expired violates the State's property right, provided the conditions of access themselves comply with the constitution. That right may be defended by preventing entry or enforcing removal, subject to the NAP and proportionality. State ownership does not extend to privately owned land and does not itself confer a right to remove someone from a private parcel whose owner permits them to remain.

Homesteading

Article VI: Laws, Section 2, includes the following means of acquiring property rights:

Homesteading: first use of an unowned resource in the commons, unless a law prohibits homesteading of that land within the State Territory.

Land without an individual owner is not thereby outside the population's collective territorial ownership. Permission to enter or reside does not confer an unrestricted right to homestead it. The constitutional exception allows citizens to prohibit homesteading through law, including homesteading by non-citizens.

For example, a large parcel of unowned land may be too extensive to appropriate through actual use. Through direct democracy, citizens may instead enact a law designating it as a national park and prohibiting homesteading within its boundaries.

Section 4 expressly preserves this exception when identifying violations of the NAP:

Attempting to control or obstruct the use of property one does not own (forestalling), including preventing homesteading except where a law prohibits it under Section 2, restricting exit from property, or blocking retrieval of one’s own property.

Comparison with Hoppe

Hans-Hermann Hoppe likewise grounds admission in property rights and freedom of association. His account includes communities whose owners establish contractual conditions for entry and membership, and distinguishes permission to work or reside from citizenship and access to publicly funded benefits. He also requires hosts or immigrants to bear the costs of admission rather than impose them on others. These principles support selective admission. See his extended interview.

The justification for recognising state ownership differs. VoTa grounds recognition of the citizens' association as a possible property owner in their overwhelming majority within the territory. This does not establish ownership of the territory as a whole. Hoppe grounds ownership in property acquisition and contract. His account does not establish territorial ownership merely from citizenship or numerical majority.

Co-ownership and saleable shares

Hoppe expressly accepts co-ownership with majority decision-making. In Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization, he describes a road built through a community effort, with each member initially an equal co-owner. He considers an arrangement in which:

it is the majority of the street owners that determines what to do or not to do with it.

He accepts this provided a dissatisfied owner can sell their share while retaining their existing right of passage. In VoTa, there is no concept of citizens selling shares in state-owned property.

Does public ownership necessarily produce conflict?

In Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization, Hoppe claims:

only private property can help avoid otherwise—under conditions of scarcity—unavoidable conflict.

VoTa assigns ownership of state property to the State and provides direct democracy as the procedure for deciding its use, subject to the NAP and NDP. Disagreement over its use does not establish that this procedure must fail. Hoppe himself accepts majority decisions among private co-owners.

A privately owned village water well can also give its owner considerable power over people who depend on it. If another well is prohibitively expensive, competition may offer no practical protection against monopoly prices. State ownership under VoTa allows citizens to determine access and use, with a private operator paid under a public-service contract. The NDP constrains discrimination; the service contract can specify supply, quality, and payment. The issue is what each owner may do to dependent users, not simply whether the owner is private or public.

Clear ownership and decision rules can settle who is entitled to decide. Neither private nor state ownership eliminates competing preferences or guarantees that rights will never be violated. Hoppe's examples of abuses of public ownership do not establish that those abuses are inevitable under VoTa's constitutional rules.

Democratic rulers as temporary caretakers

In Political Economy of Monarchy and Democracy, Hoppe argues that a democratic ruler has an incentive to extract benefits while in office at the expense of the long-term value of the assets under his control:

He owns the current use of government resources, but not their capital value.

This particular argument concerns representative democracy, where political office-holders exercise power temporarily. VoTa has no such rulers: citizens make decisions through direct democracy.

Direct democracy and property rights

Asked about Swiss direct democracy in his 2010 interview with Schweizer Monat, Hoppe says:

Yes, of course democracy, whether direct or indirect, is a form of communism.

His objection is that a majority can decide how someone else's property is used. VoTa protects property rights against such decisions. Article VI: Laws, Section 4, states:

It is unlawful for any resident or any agent of the State to violate the NAP.

A majority vote cannot authorise aggression against someone's property. The State is bound by the NAP just as individuals are. In VoTa, property rights take precedence over democratic decisions.

Taxation and consent

In his October 2024 interview with Sergio Sarmiento, Hoppe endorses the view that taxation is theft, explaining:

People have never agreed to it; it was imposed on them.

In VoTa, all three parties consent:

  • Citizens voluntarily agree not to supply businesses that are not tax compliant, including supplying labour.
  • Businesses choose to be tax compliant so that citizens can supply them.
  • Consumers agree to pay tax when they make voluntary purchases through payment systems that deduct the tax.

Central banks and money creation

In his October 2024 interview, Hoppe criticises central banks because:

they can simply print money out of thin air.

VoTa's Central Bank has no such power. The Monetary system article prohibits creating or destroying currency and requires every transfer to preserve the total supply. The Central Bank also cannot borrow, lend, or hold assets.

Contracts for public services

Discussing private security providers in his 2010 interview, Hoppe requires defined services and obligations, and consent to changes:

These contracts must contain clear property descriptions … and they can be changed during their agreed period of validity only by mutual consent.

VoTa likewise requires defined contractual duties. Under the Public services article, each service, including police and judicial services, is provided by a private operator under contract. The contract must specify outputs, quality, responsible persons, payment measures, and procedures for breach, termination, and replacement. Citizens fund these services through VoTa's tax system rather than each purchasing a separate protection contract.

Impartial adjudication

In The Mind of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, he describes how disputes involving security providers and their clients would be resolved:

the conflicting parties contractually agree to arbitration by a mutually trusted but independent third party.

VoTa's Judiciary article requires competing accredited judicial services, selection by a neutral mechanism for initial adjudication, and randomly selected panels for appeals. No judicial service has exclusive authority over a domain of law or constitutional interpretation.

These provisions do not by themselves settle Hoppe's objection. Judicial services are still part of VoTa's public-service system. A remaining question is how conflicts of interest are handled when a case concerns their own accreditation, funding, or powers.

Admission based on culture, ethnicity and religion

Hoppe permits owners and contractual communities to select entrants on broader grounds, including culture, ethnicity and religion. In On Free Immigration and Forced Integration, Section III, he describes admission in an anarcho-capitalist society as allowing:

… discrimination based on racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural or whatever other grounds as individual owners or associations of individual owners allow.

This is not permitted in VoTa because of the NDP.