Index
  1. Part I: Foundations
  2. Chapter 1: Introduction
  3. Chapter 2: The state
  4. 2.1 Understanding VoTa
  5. 2.2 What VoTa Opposes
  6. 2.3 Liberty
  7. 2.4 Comparison to neoliberalism
  8. 2.5 The state without political government
  9. 2.6 Fixing anarcho-capitalism
  10. 2.7 Bridging capitalists and socialists
  11. 2.8 Does wealth tend to concentrate?
  12. 2.9 Immigration
  13. Chapter 3: Free markets versus democracy?
  14. 3.1 Division of labour
  15. 3.2 The democratic pressure for redistribution
  16. 3.3 The instability of interventionism
  17. 3.4 The gold standard and democracy
  18. 3.5 Globalisation and democracy
  19. 3.6 Cronyism: the common enemy
  20. 3.7 The VoTa solution
  21. Chapter 4: The Non‑Discrimination Principle (NDP)
  22. 4.1 Equality before the law
  23. 4.2 What the NDP allows
  24. 4.3 The NDP as a stabilising constraint
  25. Chapter 5: Consequences of the NDP
  26. 5.1 No tyranny of the majority
  27. 5.2 No state-enforced segregation
  28. 5.3 No disincentives to work and save
  29. 5.4 People can discriminate
  30. 5.5 No monopolies
  31. 5.6 The NDP collapses complexity
  32. 5.7 NDP implies tax choice
  33. 5.8 NDP implies no political government
  34. 5.9 No discretionary enforcement
  35. 5.10 No targeted subsidies, incentives, or penalties
  36. 5.11 No identity‑based or circumstance‑based legal categories
  37. 5.12 No progressive or bracketed taxation
  38. 5.13 No zoning or land‑use discrimination
  39. 5.14 No targeted welfare or social programs
  40. 5.15 No identity‑based political representation
  41. 5.16 No selective emergency powers
  42. 5.17 No selective access to justice
  43. 5.18 No cronyism
  44. 5.19 The NDP implies a free market
  45. Part II: Laws
  46. Chapter 6: Rule of law
  47. 6.1 Only Persons bear legal responsibility
  48. 6.2 Every business has one owner
  49. 6.3 Worker cooperatives without shared ownership
  50. Chapter 7: Regulations
  51. 7.1 Bureaucracy in Australia
  52. 7.2 Hong Kong's free-market growth
  53. 7.3 Measuring regulation in the United States
  54. 7.4 Jet engines: regulation and the design space
  55. Chapter 8: Property rights
  56. Chapter 9: Intellectual property
  57. Chapter 10: Illicit Drugs
  58. Chapter 11: Punishment
  59. Chapter 12: Judiciary System
  60. Chapter 13: Surveillance
  61. Part III: The Economy
  62. Chapter 14: The Free Market
  63. Chapter 15: Monetary system
  64. 15.1 Commercial banks
  65. 15.2 Private currencies
  66. Chapter 16: Commerce Account and Transaction System (CATS)
  67. 16.1 Predica data model for CATS
  68. Chapter 17: Tax
  69. 17.1 Tax rates
  70. 17.2 Central Bank Payment System
  71. 17.3 Private C-accounts
  72. 17.4 Refunds
  73. 17.5 Death, incapacity and abandonment
  74. 17.6 Tax choice
  75. 17.7 Gifts, Inheritance, and Dependent Allowances
  76. 17.8 Product Categories
  77. 17.9 Supply Chains
  78. 17.10 Compatibility Relation
  79. 17.11 Tax evasion avoidance
  80. 17.12 Allocation of tax to public services
  81. 17.13 Consumption tax is not regressive
  82. Chapter 18: Foreign trade
  83. 18.1 Purpose-specific foreign-trade intermediaries
  84. 18.2 Ensuring consumption tax is paid
  85. 18.3 Foreign travel
  86. 18.4 Foreign investment
  87. 18.5 Foreign remittances
  88. Chapter 19: UBI
  89. 19.1 Unconditional welfare
  90. 19.2 UBI determination and formulas
  91. 19.3 Comparison with the Australian Government
  92. 19.4 Preventing poverty and welfare exclusion
  93. 19.5 Wider effects of the UBI
  94. Chapter 20: Economics
  95. 20.1 Inflation
  96. 20.2 Employment opportunities without formal qualifications
  97. 20.3 Predictability and stability
  98. 20.4 Austrian economics and VoTa
  99. 20.5 VoTa versus Modern Monetary Theory
  100. 20.6 The origin of money
  101. 20.7 Commercial banks and private money creation
  102. 20.8 The boom causes the bust
  103. 20.9 Richard Werner
  104. 20.10 Modelling VoTa as a dynamic monetary system
  105. Part IV: Democracy and Governance
  106. Chapter 21: Direct versus representational democracy
  107. 21.1 Jordan Peterson on democracy
  108. 21.2 Information complexity
  109. 21.3 Subjective values vs objective outcomes
  110. 21.4 The people should have the final say
  111. 21.5 Problems with representational democracy
  112. Chapter 22: Initiatives
  113. Chapter 23: Voting
  114. 23.1 Voluntary voting
  115. 23.2 Amendments to the constitution
  116. 23.3 Competence check
  117. 23.4 Capture by criminal organisations
  118. 23.5 Score voting
  119. 23.6 Avoiding the tyranny of the majority
  120. Chapter 24: Emergency Governance
  121. Chapter 25: Proxies
  122. Part V: Public services
  123. Chapter 26: Contracts
  124. Chapter 27: Funding
  125. Chapter 28: Employment guarantees
  126. Chapter 29: Procurement
  127. Chapter 30: Competition
  128. Chapter 31: Defence services
  129. Chapter 32: Judicial services
  130. Chapter 33: Portals
  131. Chapter 34: Solving the Economic Calculation Problem for public service
  132. Chapter 35: Communal Centres
  133. Chapter 36: Child care
  134. Chapter 37: Public services model
  135. Chapter 38: Failure
  136. Part VI: Predica data model
  137. Chapter 39: Introduction
  138. Chapter 40: Time
  139. Chapter 41: Person
  140. Chapter 42: Denomination
  141. Chapter 43: Account
  142. Chapter 44: Loans
  143. Chapter 45: Purchases
  144. Chapter 46: Escrow
  145. Chapter 47: Assets
  146. Part VII: Implementation
  147. Chapter 48: Online Portals
  148. Chapter 49: Robustness and security
  149. Chapter 50: Adoption
  150. 50.1 Principles
  151. 50.2 Incremental transition to privately operated public services
  152. 50.3 Monetary-system conversion
  153. 50.4 In-place monetary-system conversion
  154. 50.5 Legacy central-bank transition
  155. 50.6 Tax-system conversion
  156. 50.7 Transition from means-tested welfare
  157. 50.8 Phasing out discretionary political power
  158. 50.9 Education and public understanding
  159. 50.10 Financial transition risks requiring further work
  160. Chapter 51: Adoption through coexistence
  161. 51.1 World-wide coexistence
  162. Chapter 52: Adoption through territorial expansion

6.1 Only Persons bear legal responsibility

This is a philosophical position grounded in the Person as the locus of action and responsibility for those actions. Organisations act only through Persons.

  • Businesses are not formalised as entities by the Constitution or the State.
  • A voluntary contract may define a business as a contractual entity within a business arrangement.
  • The contract may define its owners, impose requirements on it, and provide for financial obligations to transfer when ownership changes.
  • Only a Person can bear responsibility for compliance with those requirements.
  • Transfer of a financial obligation does not transfer responsibility for the conduct that caused it.
  • Only a Person can commit an offence.
  • A business, association, office, or other organisation is not a Person.
  • Each Central Bank account is owned by exactly one Person.
  • Acting through an organisation does not shield a Person from responsibility.
  • A Person is not responsible merely because they own, belong to, or work for an organisation.
  • Responsibility arises from the Person's actions or voluntarily accepted contracts.
  • Delegation does not remove responsibility assigned to an account owner or other contracting Person.
  • An unconstitutional State action may be invalidated without treating the State as a Person.

No shared ownership

Article VI: Laws, Section 2: Property rights states:

Every property right shall have exactly one owner. A purported property right shared by two or more Persons has no legal meaning and shall not be recognised or protected by the State.

A property right is the right to exclude others from using a resource. For a property right to exist, it must have a single owner. If one Person decides to exclude someone and another Person, claiming the same right, decides not to exclude them, both decisions cannot prevail. Without a single owner there is no property right to settle the conflicting claims.

Voting, arbitration, a casting vote, or any other decision procedure does not make ownership shared. It determines which decision prevails. A Person whose decision can be defeated does not possess the property right over that decision. A requirement for unanimity does not produce a decision when the Persons disagree; it gives each Person a veto and leaves the use of the property determined by a default rule.

Shared property rights are not recognised as having any legal meaning in VoTa. Each property right belongs to exactly one Person, so the authority to decide and the responsibility for the decision remain identifiable. Several Persons may hold different rights concerning the same property. A Person may have permission to use it, a contractual right to receive income from it, or authority delegated by its owner. Those rights do not make that Person a co-owner. A transfer replaces the owner; it does not add another owner.

Persons who attempt to create a shared property right risk the State not protecting any of their purported rights. Because the State does not recognise the property as having an owner, it does not recognise a property right for any of the participants to enforce.

Nor can property be owned by a company, association, or other collective. A collective has no will apart from the Persons who act for it. Describing the collective as the owner obscures who has authority and who bears responsibility. VoTa instead requires ownership and related contractual rights to be assigned to identifiable Persons. Consistently with this principle, every Central Bank account has exactly one owner.

Profit shares replace equity shares

VoTa does not abolish shares or the share market. It recognises a share as a transferable contractual right to receive an agreed portion of the profits of a business, rather than as an ownership interest in a company. A business owner can sell profit shares to raise capital while remaining the single owner of the property used by the business.

Profit shares preserve the economic purposes served by equity shares. Investors may buy them to receive profit distributions, conventionally called dividends. They may also buy them in the expectation that the shares will increase in value. When a business is expected to earn greater profits, the anticipated stream of dividends is more valuable and investors may pay more for the corresponding profit shares. An investor can realise that increase in value by selling the shares on the share market.

This simplifies and clarifies the legal relationships without preventing companies from raising investment or investors from earning returns. The business owner owns the property, makes decisions about its use, and bears the associated responsibility. Each investor owns a defined financial right. Trading a profit share changes the Person entitled to the associated payments; it does not transfer or divide ownership of the business. If the owner wishes to give up control, the owner may instead sell the property right to a single new owner.

A profit-share agreement must define the profits to which it applies, the proportion payable, its duration, its transferability, and what happens when ownership of the business property changes. Standardised profit shares can be listed and traded on exchanges in the same way as equity shares. Companies therefore retain access to a share market, but that market trades financial rights rather than purported fractions of a shared property right.

Related ideas

  • Methodological individualism explains collective activity through the actions of individual Persons.
  • The Nuremberg principle states that crimes against international law are committed by human beings, not abstract entities.
  • Individualist criticism of collective responsibility rejects guilt based only on membership of a group.
  • The nexus-of-contracts theory treats a corporation as a set of contracts among Persons rather than as a natural Person.
  • United States v. Wise recognises that acting through a corporation does not necessarily shield a Person from responsibility for their conduct.

Modern legal systems generally take the opposite practical route: they create corporate persons and impose civil or criminal entity liability. Corporate personhood is explicitly recognised as a legal fiction used so corporations can sue and be sued.

TODO

Review these areas of the Constitution:

  • The Definitions Article defines a Producer as an organisational entity. Restrict Producer to a description of economic activity, not a bearer of rights or responsibility.
  • The Citizenship Article requires domestic businesses and Producers to be compliant with CBPS rules. State the required compliance in terms of their Central Bank accounts and account owners.
  • The Public Services Article defines each service by a contract with a private operator. Require the contract to identify the Persons responsible for its obligations.
  • The definition of Public Service Contract assigns obligations to a public service without identifying the Persons responsible for them.
  • The Judiciary Article assigns applications, responsibility, rulings, and interpretive authority to judicial services. Distinguish service outputs from responsibility borne by Persons.
  • The Central Bank Account Holders Article permits delegated account authority. Distinguish the owner's contractual responsibility from the delegate's responsibility for their own conduct.
  • Clauses imposing requirements on the State, Central Bank, Tax Office, Portals, and public services must distinguish invalid institutional action from responsibility borne by the Persons who performed it.
PreviousChapter 6: Rule of law Next6.2 Every business has one owner