2.8 Exchange before states: the historical evidence
Exchange did not begin with states. Archaeologists have traced materials moving between human groups tens of thousands of years before the earliest known state institutions. The evidence comes from dating the deposits in which objects were found and identifying where their raw materials originated. The later appearance of states is documented by different evidence: administrative buildings, records, settlement hierarchies, territorial expansion, and royal representations of conquest.
Voluntary exchange therefore preceded states but was insufficient to prevent the formation of states. This challenges the anarcho-capitalist argument that market provision of defence will predominate because peaceful cooperation is profitable and conflict is expensive, resisting consolidation into large territorial states. The historical sequence challenges the sufficiency of that argument: the benefits of exchange did not prevent coercive territorial power from emerging. Avoiding costly conflict can also mean yielding to an expanding aggressor, allowing consolidation to proceed one concession at a time.
People could also agree to help defend one another. Such agreements do not require sophisticated institutions. The question is why voluntary arrangements for exchange and mutual protection would reliably prevent armed groups from consolidating territorial power.
Stone transport in East Africa around 320,000 years ago
At Olorgesailie in Kenya, Alison Brooks and colleagues investigated Middle Stone Age sites dated to roughly 320,000–295,000 years ago using argon and uranium-series methods. Their 2018 study in Science reports the transport of stone from distant sources, alongside changes in toolmaking and the use of pigments. Obsidian is particularly useful for this research because its chemical composition can be matched to volcanic sources. The research team's account describes obsidian arriving from several directions, from sources up to 95 kilometres away, whereas the earlier handaxe makers had used stone from within about five kilometres.
This establishes long-distance transport. Exchange between groups is an interpretation of that pattern; a distant source alone cannot tell us whether a toolmaker acquired the stone through exchange or travelled to collect it. The importance of the find is that extensive material connections were already possible hundreds of thousands of years before states.
Bead exchange in southern Africa around 33,000 years ago
Brian Stewart and colleagues' 2020 study in PNAS examined ostrich eggshell beads from Melikane and Sehonghong in highland Lesotho. They compared strontium isotope ratios in the beads with the geological signatures of surrounding regions. The results traced the eggshell to areas hundreds of kilometres away and showed that these connections extended back about 33,000 years.
The authors argue for exchange networks because the inferred distances exceed those normally covered in hunter-gatherers' seasonal movements. Beads could pass through successive partners; one person need not have travelled the entire distance. Such relationships could provide access to people and resources in different environments when local conditions deteriorated. This is evidence for sustained cooperation beyond the local group, without a state organising it. It does not establish that the beads were bought and sold in markets: gift exchange and reciprocal obligations can also move goods over large distances.
The much later emergence of territorial states
In Territorial expansion and primary state formation (2010), archaeologist Charles Spencer examines six regions: Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus Valley, China, Mesoamerica, and Peru. These cases concern the emergence of states within separate cultural traditions, rather than the worldwide expansion of a single original state. Spencer identifies a recurring association between bureaucratic government and the extension of political control beyond the capital's immediate surroundings.
For Mesopotamia, Spencer dates the emergence of the Uruk state to around 3500 BCE. Uruk covered roughly 200 hectares and contained large temples and administrative buildings. The evidence concerns organised authority over a wider territory, not merely a large settlement or a busy trading centre. Spencer's explanation is that territorial expansion both required delegated administration and supplied resources to sustain it.
Egypt provides a particularly direct expression of coercive kingship. The Narmer Palette, dated to about 3100 BCE, depicts the king wearing the crowns associated with Upper and Lower Egypt, taking part in a victory procession, and raising a weapon over an enemy. It is commonly interpreted as commemorating unification. A royal monument is a claim about power rather than an impartial account of events, but the claim itself is revealing: the ruler celebrates subjugation. The Egyptian Museum notes that the image of a king striking an enemy continued to appear on Egyptian temples thousands of years later.
How territorial monopolies became entrenched
For later European history, Charles Tilly's War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (1985) examines how rulers built armies, extracted resources, protected allies, and suppressed rivals within their claimed territories. Financing war encouraged the development of taxation and permanent administration. Eliminating rival armed powers made further extraction easier. Commerce could help finance this process rather than prevent it: rulers depended on credit and accumulated capital as well as coercion.
This gives a historical mechanism for the persistence of territorial power even when particular rulers or dynasties fall. An army, revenue system, and administrative apparatus can be taken over by successors. The survival of those institutions does not require the survival of their founders. Tilly's account concerns European state formation; it does not establish a single explanation for every state in history.
What this means for anarcho-capitalism
The chronology establishes that people could cooperate and exchange goods without states, and that states nevertheless arose much later in several regions. It does not show that prehistoric societies had anarcho-capitalist property law or competing commercial defence agencies. Nor does it show that every stateless society must become a state.
The difficulty for anarcho-capitalism is explaining what would prevent a recurrence. Showing that voluntary exchange benefits both parties does not explain why armed organisations could not eventually impose territorial control. The historical record gives reason to take that possibility seriously. A proposal for lasting freedom must explain how people can prevent coercive power from accumulating across generations, even while exchange continues.