Chapter 31: Defence services
In this constitution, defence services are not treated as a special or privileged branch of government. They operate in the same manner as all other public services: contracted from the private sector, funded directly by taxpayers, and accountable to them at all times. This prevents the concentration of military power and ensures that defence remains a servant of the public rather than an authority above it.
Defence operators must work strictly within the bounds of the Non‑Aggression Principle:
- Aggression is defined as initiating or threatening to initiate significant interference with a person’s property rights or agreements through force, fraud, or negligence.
- It is unlawful for any resident or any agent of the State to violate the NAP.
- Every person has the right to use proportionate force in self‑defense or in defense of others, and to seek restitution for violations of their rights.
They may not initiate force, act pre‑emptively without clear evidence of imminent threat, or exercise coercive power beyond what is authorised in their service contract. Their sole legitimate function is the protection of persons and property against aggression.
Because defence services are funded through voluntary tax allocation, their size naturally reflects public perception of risk. In peaceful periods, defence may be minimal; in times of danger, taxpayers can rapidly increase funding. Emergency initiatives allow experts to propose new defence measures, which the public can debate, vote on, and fund within a short timeframe.
Transparency requirements ensure that defence operators remain accountable. Contracts may mandate public reporting on costs, capabilities, performance, and adherence to constitutional limits. Competing operators may exist simultaneously, allowing taxpayers to support those who demonstrate competence, efficiency, and respect for the NAP.
By decentralising defence and binding it to public choice, contractual limits, and the NAP, the constitution prevents the emergence of a coercive military apparatus while still enabling rapid, effective protection when genuinely needed.
Organisation of defence operators
There may be many defence operators, each working under a separate service contract. Surveillance, logistics, communications, cyber defence, transport, equipment maintenance, training, and different forms of armed protection can be contracted separately rather than placed permanently within one organisation.
As with public services generally, a large number of small contracts is preferable to a small number of large contracts. Smaller contracts expose the cost and performance of each service, allow an operator to be replaced without replacing the entire defence system, contain individual failures, and avoid concentrating military capability in one operator. A contract should nevertheless remain large enough to describe an operationally coherent service.
Many operators do not require a flat organisation. Higher-level operators can be contracted to orchestrate other operators and issue instructions to them. The contracts define which operators may issue instructions, which operators must follow them, the scope of that authority, and the outcomes for which each operator is responsible. Several layers of contractual hierarchy may be used where the task requires them.
A coordinating operator is not a sovereign military leader. Its authority exists only through the relevant contracts, remains subject to the NAP, and extends no further than the work needed to coordinate the contracted services.
No declaration of war
The constitution contains no notion of a declaration of war. No figurehead or leader is needed to make such a declaration, and there is no change of legal status from peace to war which expands the powers of the State. People and defence operators may use proportionate force in self‑defense or in defense of others. That authority arises from the act of defense itself, not from a declaration. A declaration cannot turn aggression into self‑defense or authorise conduct which would otherwise violate the NAP.
Conscription is impossible
Defence services cannot compel anyone to serve. Article VI: Laws, Section 5: Regulations states:
- The State shall not suspend, override, or expand its powers on the basis of emergency, crisis, or necessity.
- No law shall grant the State additional powers on the basis of national security, public order, or similar justifications beyond those permitted under the Non‑Aggression Principle.
- No resident shall be compelled to perform labour or service for the State except as restitution following conviction for aggression.
Conscription is compelled service for the State and is therefore prohibited. War, invasion, emergency, or a shortage of volunteers cannot create an exception. Neither a law, an initiative, nor a defence-service contract can authorise it. The restitution exception applies only following an individual's conviction for aggression and cannot be used to conscript the population.