Chapter 6: Rule of law

There are two essential requirements for the rule of law under this constitution.

  • First, every law must directly codify the constitution. No law can exist outside its provisions. This means the constitution itself strictly limits what laws may be created.
  • Second, laws must be as objective as reasonably possible. By reducing reliance on subjective interpretation, we minimize the influence of personal opinions within the judiciary.

NAP

The NAP is not a moral code. It is a legal boundary. The law does not cover every moral obligation or cultural norm. In other words, the legal system is only a subset of ethics. Many things may be unethical, yet still legal: bullying, lying to a friend, cheating on a spouse, or neglecting family responsibilities.

At the foundation of this constitution lies the Non‑Aggression Principle, or NAP. It is the bedrock of the entire legal structure, binding both residents and the state itself.

Aggression is defined as the initiation of significant interference with someone’s property rights or voluntary agreements. That interference may come through direct force, through fraud, or through negligence.

The principle guarantees that everyone retains the fundamental right to use force in self‑defense, whether defending themselves or others, and the right to seek just restitution for any damages they suffer.

Violations include attempts to control property you do not own, such as blocking someone from retrieving their belongings or preventing access to unowned land. Breaking a contract is also a violation, because it amounts to fraud.

Creating significant risk is prohibited, for example, driving while intoxicated. And unjustified searches of private property are forbidden, even in the name of criminal investigation.

Free expression is protected to the fullest extent. Only speech that directly incites immediate violence, violence that would itself violate the NAP, is prohibited. All other forms of speech remain protected.

The Non‑Aggression Principle is the objective standard by which all interactions and conflicts in this society are judged.

Protecting areas of the commons from homesteading

Homesteading is the default means of acquiring an unowned resource through first use. However, Article VI: Laws, Section 2: Property rights allows laws to prohibit homesteading of particular land within the State Territory. Through direct democracy, the people can therefore decide that defined areas should remain in the commons.

For example, the people could vote for a law protecting an unowned area from homesteading as a national park. They could also prohibit homesteading within 200 metres of a river or within a defined distance of the ocean, keeping riverbanks or coastal areas in the commons. Such laws concern characteristics and boundaries of land, rather than characteristics of the people who might wish to homestead it. The same prohibition applies to everyone, subject to the NDP.

To make these laws objective, their boundaries and criteria must be clearly defined. A river-distance rule, for example, should specify the river boundary from which the distance is measured and how changes in its course affect the protected area. People should be able to determine whether land is available for homesteading before attempting to acquire it.

These restrictions apply only to land that is unowned when they take effect. A vote to protect an area cannot revoke existing legitimate ownership, seize someone's land, or return privately owned land to the commons. For example, a new prohibition on homesteading within 200 metres of a river would not remove ownership of land already legitimately acquired within that distance. The power concerns whether new ownership may arise through homesteading, not whether existing ownership may be taken away.

Land protected from homesteading remains in the commons; it does not become the state's property. Keeping an area in the commons also does not, by itself, prohibit every activity within it. Any further restriction must have its own basis in the Constitution. This illustrates how direct democracy can exercise an expressly granted power while remaining within the constitutional limits of the NAP and NDP.

Colonisation and existing land rights

Extending the State Territory does not make land already owned or used by its inhabitants available for appropriation as unowned commons. Indigenous people's existing use of land must be recognised under the same homesteading rules that apply to everyone else. Their use cannot be disregarded because of their ancestry or culture, or merely because they lack a title issued by the incoming state. Where that use has established legitimate property rights, incorporating the land into the State Territory does not extinguish those rights. The state cannot use colonisation as a justification for forcing the owners off their land or granting it to newcomers.

Labour spent improving land can make evidence of homesteading clearer. Dwellings, cultivated areas, wells, and maintained irrigation provide tangible evidence of use and can help establish the extent of a claim. Such improvements can also support recognition of continuing ownership during an absence. They are evidence of homesteading, rather than a requirement replacing the constitutional principle of first use.

Nomadic and seasonal use raises the question of when property has been abandoned. Absence must be distinguished from relinquishing ownership: people must be able to take extended trips, use land seasonally, or own more than one home without losing property merely because they are not continuously present. Abandonment rules should require clear evidence that ownership has been relinquished, rather than treating non-use alone as sufficient. Laws adopted through direct democracy must define the conditions under which property is considered abandoned as objectively and clearly as reasonably possible. Under the NDP, those conditions must apply universally: the same pattern of use or absence must be assessed by the same rules, regardless of the person's ancestry, culture, or identity.

Protection of access also matters for nomadic use. The Constitution prohibits homesteading that blocks access between resources not owned by the homesteader. This can protect established routes connecting land used by nomadic people: a later homesteader cannot acquire a right to exclude others in a way that cuts off that access. Protecting passage need not require ownership of the entire route. The same access rule applies to everyone under the NDP.

Any finding that land has returned to the commons must therefore follow the generally applicable abandonment rules. The state cannot simply declare indigenous land abandoned to make it available for settlement. The protection follows from equal recognition of existing property rights and equal application of the law.

Duty to warn or prevent harm

This clause defines the limits of an individual’s responsibility for the property of others.

In general, residents are not responsible for the misfortunes of others. A legal duty to act only arises in specific circumstances:

  • When there is an implicit duty of care, for example, the responsibility parents naturally hold toward their children.
  • When someone creates a dangerous situation, they are obligated to remove the hazard or warn others.
  • When an explicit contract exists, such as a security firm agreeing to protect a property. Failure here is a breach of contract.

The law makes a clear distinction: actively causing harm, known as misfeasance, usually brings legal liability. But simply allowing harm to occur through inaction, called nonfeasance, generally does not.

Forcing someone by law to intervene physically or spend resources to help a stranger is seen as a serious intrusion on liberty and bodily autonomy. And if such a general duty were imposed, its limits would be impossible to define. Who would be required to act: those present, or anyone aware of the situation? And how far must they go, even at risk to themselves?

Even if a person knows of a high risk of serious harm to another’s property, they are not legally required to act, even if preventing that harm would take little effort or pose little risk. That does not make their choice moral. Society may condemn and shun them for failing in a duty of care, even if the law does not.

Punishment for violations of the NAP

For several reasons the state holds a monopoly on the punishment of crime:

  • Maintaining Social Order: Without a single authority responsible for justice, individuals would seek retribution privately. That leads to cycles of vengeance, feuds, and instability, as philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber warned.
  • Impartiality and Rule of Law: The justice system is designed to apply punishments consistently and impartially, according to public rules. This prevents arbitrary or excessive punishment driven by emotion, bias, or social power.
  • Proportionality and Consistency: State punishment aims to match the gravity of the crime. Private vengeance often fails here. Some victims may overreact, while others may lack the power to enforce any punishment at all. The state provides a standardized scale of justice.
  • Deterrence and Protection: Punishment serves as a credible, public deterrent. By incapacitating offenders and discouraging others, the state protects society in ways private individuals cannot achieve.
  • Legitimacy and Trust: A fair justice system builds public confidence. Citizens trust that wrongs will be addressed properly, encouraging compliance with laws and participation in the social contract.
  • Community Values: Crime is treated not only as harm against an individual, but as a violation of the community’s shared values.