v0.1
A constitution for a voluntary state with tax choice
Index
- Part I: Foundations
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: The state
- 2.1 Understanding VoTa
- 2.2 What VoTa Opposes
- 2.3 Liberty
- 2.4 Comparison to neoliberalism
- 2.5 The state without political government
- 2.6 Fixing anarcho-capitalism
- 2.7 Bridging capitalists and socialists
- 2.8 Does wealth tend to concentrate?
- 2.9 Immigration
- Chapter 3: Free markets versus democracy?
- 3.1 Division of labour
- 3.2 The democratic pressure for redistribution
- 3.3 The instability of interventionism
- 3.4 The gold standard and democracy
- 3.5 Globalisation and democracy
- 3.6 Cronyism: the common enemy
- 3.7 The VoTa solution
- Chapter 4: The Non‑Discrimination Principle (NDP)
- 4.1 Equality before the law
- 4.2 What the NDP allows
- 4.3 The NDP as a stabilising constraint
- Chapter 5: Consequences of the NDP
- 5.1 No tyranny of the majority
- 5.2 No state-enforced segregation
- 5.3 No disincentives to work and save
- 5.4 People can discriminate
- 5.5 No monopolies
- 5.6 The NDP collapses complexity
- 5.7 NDP implies tax choice
- 5.8 NDP implies no political government
- 5.9 No discretionary enforcement
- 5.10 No targeted subsidies, incentives, or penalties
- 5.11 No identity‑based or circumstance‑based legal categories
- 5.12 No progressive or bracketed taxation
- 5.13 No zoning or land‑use discrimination
- 5.14 No targeted welfare or social programs
- 5.15 No identity‑based political representation
- 5.16 No selective emergency powers
- 5.17 No selective access to justice
- 5.18 No cronyism
- 5.19 The NDP implies a free market
- Part II: Laws
- Chapter 6: Rule of law
- 6.1 Only Persons bear legal responsibility
- 6.2 Every business has one owner
- 6.3 Worker cooperatives without shared ownership
- Chapter 7: Regulations
- 7.1 Bureaucracy in Australia
- 7.2 Hong Kong's free-market growth
- 7.3 Measuring regulation in the United States
- 7.4 Jet engines: regulation and the design space
- Chapter 8: Property rights
- Chapter 9: Intellectual property
- Chapter 10: Illicit Drugs
- Chapter 11: Punishment
- Chapter 12: Judiciary System
- Chapter 13: Surveillance
- Part III: The Economy
- Chapter 14: The Free Market
- Chapter 15: Monetary system
- 15.1 Commercial banks
- 15.2 Private currencies
- Chapter 16: Commerce Account and Transaction System (CATS)
- 16.1 Predica data model for CATS
- Chapter 17: Tax
- 17.1 Tax rates
- 17.2 Central Bank Payment System
- 17.3 Private C-accounts
- 17.4 Refunds
- 17.5 Death, incapacity and abandonment
- 17.6 Tax choice
- 17.7 Gifts, Inheritance, and Dependent Allowances
- 17.8 Product Categories
- 17.9 Supply Chains
- 17.10 Compatibility Relation
- 17.11 Tax evasion avoidance
- 17.12 Allocation of tax to public services
- 17.13 Consumption tax is not regressive
- Chapter 18: Foreign trade
- 18.1 Purpose-specific foreign-trade intermediaries
- 18.2 Ensuring consumption tax is paid
- 18.3 Foreign travel
- 18.4 Foreign investment
- 18.5 Foreign remittances
- Chapter 19: UBI
- 19.1 Unconditional welfare
- 19.2 UBI determination and formulas
- 19.3 Comparison with the Australian Government
- 19.4 Preventing poverty and welfare exclusion
- 19.5 Wider effects of the UBI
- Chapter 20: Economics
- 20.1 Inflation
- 20.2 Employment opportunities without formal qualifications
- 20.3 Predictability and stability
- 20.4 Austrian economics and VoTa
- 20.5 VoTa versus Modern Monetary Theory
- 20.6 The origin of money
- 20.7 Commercial banks and private money creation
- 20.8 The boom causes the bust
- 20.9 Richard Werner
- 20.10 Modelling VoTa as a dynamic monetary system
- Part IV: Democracy and Governance
- Chapter 21: Direct versus representational democracy
- 21.1 Jordan Peterson on democracy
- 21.2 Information complexity
- 21.3 Subjective values vs objective outcomes
- 21.4 The people should have the final say
- 21.5 Problems with representational democracy
- Chapter 22: Initiatives
- Chapter 23: Voting
- 23.1 Voluntary voting
- 23.2 Amendments to the constitution
- 23.3 Competence check
- 23.4 Capture by criminal organisations
- 23.5 Score voting
- 23.6 Avoiding the tyranny of the majority
- Chapter 24: Emergency Governance
- Chapter 25: Proxies
- Part V: Public services
- Chapter 26: Contracts
- Chapter 27: Funding
- Chapter 28: Employment guarantees
- Chapter 29: Procurement
- Chapter 30: Competition
- Chapter 31: Defence services
- Chapter 32: Judicial services
- Chapter 33: Portals
- Chapter 34: Solving the Economic Calculation Problem for public service
- Chapter 35: Communal Centres
- Chapter 36: Child care
- Chapter 37: Public services model
- Chapter 38: Failure
- Part VI: Predica data model
- Chapter 39: Introduction
- Chapter 40: Time
- Chapter 41: Person
- Chapter 42: Denomination
- Chapter 43: Account
- Chapter 44: Loans
- Chapter 45: Purchases
- Chapter 46: Escrow
- Chapter 47: Assets
- Part VII: Implementation
- Chapter 48: Online Portals
- Chapter 49: Robustness and security
- Chapter 50: Adoption
- 50.1 Principles
- 50.2 Incremental transition to privately operated public services
- 50.3 Monetary-system conversion
- 50.4 In-place monetary-system conversion
- 50.5 Legacy central-bank transition
- 50.6 Tax-system conversion
- 50.7 Transition from means-tested welfare
- 50.8 Phasing out discretionary political power
- 50.9 Education and public understanding
- 50.10 Financial transition risks requiring further work
- Chapter 51: Adoption through coexistence
- 51.1 World-wide coexistence
- Chapter 52: Adoption through territorial expansion